

DDA 75-5451

MEMORANDUM FOR: Director, Center for the Study of
Intelligence

SUBJECT : Proposals for Research Studies at the Center

REFERENCE : Undated memo to Board of Advisors, CSI,
fr Director, CSI, same subj

Dean:

Let me give you my monosyllabic reactions to the various proposals which will be considered at our 20 November meeting. I do this only that you may have my reaction before the meeting.

--Reference Team Studies:

1. Good. Excellent food for thought and a topic which could be most helpful in DDI's training and career development process.

2. Good. Believe it most important that CIA begin educating our customers as well as the world in the ingredients of successful intelligence and evaluation matrix would be most useful not only for the Agency specifically but the Community at large.

3. I still vote no. The Task Force under General Wilson also considered this topic and ducked it persuaded by the Director's contention that Congress ought to decide for itself, then sort out with the Executive. That keeps CIA out of the middle particularly should the Executive pursue a policy course of action at odds with any particular items of intelligence.

4. Okay, but not enthusiastically. I continue to be amazed that the Agency must think of methods of presentation as opposed to the customer defining what he wants.

5. Not really. This topic leaves me cold and I see it only as a forum for argument without solution.

--Moving on to Individual Projects:

1. Maybe. Almost falls into the category if nothing else to do.
2. Yes. We have been flogged by this for years in an uncoordinated, unsystematized matter. Believe an overall look might be helpful.
3. No.
4. Maybe. What I would hope would come out of this one are comments around which we could build our management training program.
5. First blush reaction is no, yet there is definitely PR value. I shudder to think some of the courses in intelligence expounded by the various universities by people with little or no appreciation of the intelligence process. It might be a useful mechanism for us to pursue.
6. Don't forget the bucks involved when it comes to public printing and who pays.
7. Not really. Believe we have enough already in our employee code of conduct. Further pursuit might well have a negative effect. It also implies a latter-day morality.
8. No. PDP should go a long way to improving career development.
9. Only if you run out of work.
10. Defer to DDI.
11. No.
12. Yes. Particularly pursuing the growing challenge of international growth development and lack of food.
13. Yes, but possibly a little too soon. Might await the maturing of our investigative committee reports, then use that as a springboard.
14. and 15. I am negative.

John N. McMahon
Associate Deputy Director
for
Administration

ADDA:JNMcMahon:kmg (17 Nov 75)
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DD/A 75-5363

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of Intelligence

SUBJECT : Proposals for Research Studies at the
Center


At the initial meeting of the Board of Advisors, the Center was asked to circulate a list to the Board of proposed research studies to be undertaken by the Center. Facilities should be available at the Center to begin at least one new project by March, 1976. In addition to the projects suggested below, it is hoped that the Board will have additional proposals, especially for studies of individual interest to particular Offices or Directorates, and that a variety of research possibilities can be discussed at the Board meeting on 20 November. It may then be possible to make a list of proposals available to the various component career boards for their background in considering the assignments of Agency personnel. The Director of Studies at the Center would welcome individual comments or suggestions from Board members unable to attend the 20 November meeting.

Among the factors that influenced the development of the proposals listed below are the following:

--That by mid-1976 the Center will have completed four of the seven projects listed in

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the draft program of February 1975. Elements of two others will have been incorporated into the compartmentation study.

- That about five new projects can probably be undertaken in calendar 1976 depending on the mix of individual and group projects.
- That at least one follow-on project stemming from a first round study is probably advisable.
- That some attention should be given to projects that can be completed in a three to six month time frame, since research fellows for such projects may be more readily available.

Center Proposed Projects

Team Studies

1. What is a Realistic Estimative Mission for the Agency and What Resources Should be Addressed to it?

Good
Discussion: Interviews conducted in the course of the CSI project on the role of CIA intelligence in policy support indicate that policy makers have significant problems with most National Intelligence Estimates and with many other CIA-produced predictions. For example, a

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number of policy people insisted that their intelligence need is for a firm definition of trends and some clear indication of branching points in the trends and signals likely to precede a particular type of change.

A careful study of the estimative mission and the machinery to produce it seems more than overdue. Are competent analysts usually competent estimators, or is a different kind of mental process involved? Is there a need for generalists as well as specialists; for bright, young aggressive minds as well as experienced old gray heads? What if any progress has there been in the predicting processes carried on in the business or academic worlds that might have helpful implications for intelligence estimating?

2. What are the Elements that Should be Measured in Determining the Success or Failure of CIA's Intelligence System?

Discussion: The Congressional probes heighten the need for such research. They expose alleged CIA "failures;" but failures by what standards? What are the ingredients that comprise successful

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intelligence? Are there different ingredients for the collectors and the processors? Research of this type would seem a useful input to the DCI's recently expressed interest in the development of a performance evaluation matrix for the Agency. Such a study should probably aim at the development of a variety of hypotheses and at efforts to test them against experience over the years.

3. What is a Realistic Mission for the CIA in the Provision of Intelligence Support to Congress and How Should it be Organized?

Discussion: A proposal for such a study was rejected by the DCI in August as too sensitive in view of the on-going Congressional investigations. We were invited to try again, however, when the situation as regards additional Congressional oversight was somewhat clearer. Presumably it will be clearer by the Spring of 197

4. What is the Future Potential for New Methods in the Presentation of Intelligence to Consumers?

Discussion: A number of Agency officers have suggested the utility of a study by the Center in this area. Such a project could undertake

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to survey the varied new approaches now being developed and used in various parts of the Agency and examine new presentational methods outside the intelligence community. It could also give consideration to the area of oral briefing which finds considerable favor with consumers according to research by the Center in connection with the intelligence support project.

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5. How Much Clandestinity Does the CIA Really Need?

Discussion: The growing exposure of CIA products, operations and procedures during the past few years is a matter of concern to us all. Before we can assess how much real damage has occurred, we must be able to make some judgments about the true degree of clandestinity necessary in various elements of Agency activities. This study would aim at an examination of various key Agency processes using a team experienced in espionage and C.I., with advisory participation of at least one officer experienced in cover operations other than espionage and probably an experienced DDI hand.

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Individual Projects From Three to Twelve Months

1. What are the areas of intelligence process and function where further development of theory might prove profitable; for example, hypotheses, criteria, or concepts about: the proper mix of intelligence data in various production situations or the application of social science and administrative doctrine to the proper organization of an intelligence apparatus.
2. Is a useful, effective intelligence requirements system possible from the standpoint of both the intelligence collectors and producers?
3. What is the validity of the criticism that DDO concern with the development and handling of agents prevents it from paying sufficient attention to the content and quality of the intelligence it gathers?
4. What are the concepts of management at the middle level in the CIA? Are there important elements in common in the management within different directorates; are there unique management problems in the CIA as opposed to other larger organizations and, if so, how are they to be handled?
5. Is it possible to develop a curriculum for a course on intelligence to be taught at the university level? What would be the outline syllabus of such a course?

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6. Undertake to update and expand the Agency's official publications about CIA that are designed for dissemination to the public.

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7. What are the professional values of intelligence officers in the CIA, and is it desirable to develop a code of ethics for intelligence officers?

8. What is the status and what are the problems and prospects for improved career development in the CIA?

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9. What, if any, are the lessons for the Agency in terms of intelligence processes and functions of our experience in Vietnam?

10. Should the Agency move in the direction of a greater multi-disciplinary approach in intelligence analysis and production?

11. How best can human source intelligence be incorporated into and put on an equivalent basis with technical intelligence in the S&T field?

12. Are the overall objectives of the collection and production processes of the Agency likely to undergo further changes in the coming decade; for example, in the direction of greater concern with international growth and development as opposed to US security?

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13. Develop a listing and discussion of the central, internal, professional problems and issues facing the Agency today, indicating what steps have been taken to resolve them and what possible further steps are needed.

14. In coping with the main problem areas of CIA activities, are there useful approaches to be considered in the ways other intelligence services cope with similar problems?

15. Utilizing the various component histories that have been written, are they useful lessons for the future in our "institutional memory"?

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